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ABSTRACT 
China's one-child policy is one of the most controversial population control measures 
implemented in modem society. While most literature focuses on the effects this policy has had 
on China's population size and economic growth, very little research has been dedicated to 
analyzing how this policy has affected wage differentials between Chinese men and women. 
Research suggests that the one-child policy redirected more educational resources towards 
Chinese daughters than in the past. Human capital theory hypothesizes that equalization in 
educational attainment corresponds to an equalizing in relative earnings. This paper uses data 
from the American Community Survey to test the hypothesis that the one-child policy advanced 
the relative earnings of Chinese immigrant women in the United States. A difference-in­
differences methodology is used to answer two questions: first, to what extent is the one-child 
policy's effect on educational attainment for Chinese women ref1ected in the immigrant 
population? Second, if the one-child policy had a positive effect on the level of educational 
attainment for Chinese immigrant women, is this reflected in their wage-earning profile, relative 
to their Chinese male immigrant counterparts? The findings of this research suggest that Chinese 
immigrant women born after the one-child policy attain higher levels of education than those 
born before. The impacts of these findings are not presently reflected in the wage-earning 
profiles of Chinese female immigrants because of their young age. However, this provides an 
opportunity for future research on the positive effects of education on earnings once women born 
under the one-child policy have engaged in work for a more substantial amount of time. 
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Section 1: Intt'oduction 
China's one-child policy was one of the most controversial population control measures 
implemented in modern society. Enacted in 1979, the purpose of the policy was to alleviate the 
pressures of an increasingly growing population by using economic and social incentives to 
encourage Chinese families to have only one child. Throughout the 60's and 70's, the fertility 
rate in China was 5.8, meaning that on average, a Chinese woman gave birth to 5.8 children 
during the course of her life (Fung 2014). After its implementation in 1979, this number 
decreased to 2.3 (Fung 2014). The drastic decline in fertility rate had a surprising effect on the 
educational attainment of Chinese daughters born under the policy (Fong 2002). Traditionally, in 
families with mUltiple children, parents had to decide how to distribute limited educational 
resources. Because of cultural and economic reasons, Chinese families disproportionally invested 
these resources in the eldest son. The one-child policy drastically changed the distribution of 
family investments in education by altering the resource allocation decision. Under the one-child 
policy, families' only child became the sole recipient of educational resources, regardless of 
gender. In a study that compared the educational attaimnents of Chinese daughters in single­
child households to the educational attaimnents of Chinese daughters in households with 
brothers, Fong (2002) found that Chinese daughters in one-child households systematically 
attained significantly higher levels of education than those with brothers or multiple children 
(Fong 2002). 
The implication of these findings for the United States are most directly manifest in the 
way the one-child policy has affected the characteristics of immigrants from China. As of 2012, 
over 1,283,000 Chinese immigrant women resided in the US, comprising 6.1 % of all foreign­
born females (American Immigration Council 2012). As the number of immigrant women from 
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China and other nations is projected to increase over the next decade, how Chinese immigrant 
women interact in the workforce will be an important issue. 
In order to shed light on the effects of the one-child policy on Chinese immigrant 
workers, this paper explores two related research questions. First, is the one-child policy's 
positive effect on educational attainment for Chinese women reflected in the immigrant 
population, and if so, to what extent? Second, if Chinese immigrant women's educational 
experience was benefited by the one-child policy, is this reflected in their age earnings profile, 
relative to their Chinese immigrant male counterparts? 
This paper analyzes these questions through the application of literature and theory to a 
set of empirical models. Section 2 explores existing literature on both immigration studies and 
gender-wage gap studies. Section 3 presents this paper's hypotheses and the economic theories 
that support them, specifically, human capital theory, and theories of positive and negative 
selection bias. Section 4 introduces the data and methodology used to test the hypotheses. 
Section 5 presents difference-in-differences analyses for both education and wages to determine 
whether Chinese women born under the one-child policy benefited in terms of educational 
attainment and wage earnings relative to several comparison groups. Section 6 reports the 
results of the OLS earnings regression models. Section 7 concludes. 
Section 2: Literatnre Review 
This paper draws from two bodies of literature: immigration studies and gender-wage gap 
studies. In order to analyze the relationship between the one-child policy's effect on education 
and the wages of Chinese female immigrants, an in-depth understanding of both the decision to 
immigrate and the relationship between male and female workers in the labor force is imperative. 
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Section 2.i immigration Studies 
Substantial literature in the field of immigration explains why certain immigrant groups 
perform better in the labor market than others (Lin, 2013; Garg and Seeborg, 2010; Cobb-Clark 
1993; Dowhan and Duleep, 2008). These studies are typically categorized into two groups: those 
that focus on the il11l11igrant selection process, and those that emphasize the impact of worker 
characteristics on the decision to migrate. 
The relationship between a migrant's home country and target country directly affects the 
decision to migrate. Borjas (1987) contended that immigrants are not randomly selected, but 
rather, the differences in opportunity between the sending and receiving countries systemically 
influences whether an individual decides to migrate. Similarly, through its legal system, the 
receiving country is also a participant in the immigrant selection process, as applications are 
reviewed and either rejected or accepted. Robinson and Tomes (1982) constructed earnings 
differentials between immigrants' receiving and sending provinces within Canada to find that the 
opportunity to earn higher wages for immigrants in a fixed education bracket was a significant 
motivator to migrate. This study has been replicated multiple times with the same basic finding 
that differences in net economic advantages and wages are the main causes of migration. 
That being said, diflerences in opportunity between countries affect workers differently. 
Roy's 1951 model on the distribution of earnings is one of the earliest papers on self-selection. 
In his paper, Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings, Roy hypothesizes that in a world 
with only two occupations: fishing and hunting, whether the best fishers will fish and the best 
hunters will hunt is based on four things: the distribution of skills, the correlation between these 
skills in the population, the technology available to enhance these skills, and consumer tastes and 
preferences (Roy 1951). Roy's main finding was that, based on these four factors, workers will 
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self-select the occupation that maximizes their earnings. In his 1987 paper, Self-Selection and the 
Earnings of Immigrants, Borjas applies Roy's model on self-selection to the decision to 
immigrate. Borjas hypothesized that different subsets of workers in a given source country find it 
worthwhile to migrate based on differences in rates of returns to human capital investment 
between the source and target countries (Borjas 1987). This hypothesis can be depicted 
graphically, as in figure 2.1, which depicts the self-selection decision for migrants. 
Dollars 
Positive Selection 
Do Not 
Move 
s, 
Move 
(a) Positive selection 
figure 2.1 
U.S. 
Skills 
Dollars 
Move DoNat Move 
(b) Negative selection 
Source 
Country 
U.S. 
Skills 
In figure 2.11, the source country is the migrant's home country and the target country is 
the United States. If the migrant's home country offers a low rate of return to the worker's 
human capital investment in skill, the wage profile will be flatter, meaning that those who are 
skilled are do not earn much more than the unskilled. This is the case in scenario (a) in figure 
2.1. In this scenario, low rates of return in the migrant's home country incentivizes migration if 
the individual is skilled at a level higher than Sp and remaining in the home country if the 
I Graphs reprinted from Borjas, George J. Labor Economics. 6th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2005. 329-43. Print. 
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individual is skilled below. This is because those who are skilled have an incentive to seek out 
higher wage 0ppOliunities in a target country with higher returns to skills, such as the United 
States. If the opposite situation is true, as is the case in scenario (b), migrants on the lower end 
of the skill distribution in the source country will be incentivized to migrate to capitalize on the 
potential for higher earnings in the target country. The impact of the combined conclusions of 
both Borjas and Roy challenged the previously accepted assumption that workers from low-wage 
countries migrate to high-wage countries without regard to rates of return to skill. 
The makeup of an immigrant population based on these two factors is a determinant of 
how well immigrants from the same country of origin perform in the labor force. Carl (2013) 
finds that immigrants that are positively selected tend to have higher levels of human capital 
investment and perform better than the native population as a result. In contrast, immigrants that 
are negatively selected tend to fill jobs that require lower levels of skill and receive lower wages 
as a result. 
The characteristic make-up of different immigrant groups has been the focus of much 
literature. These studies pay special attention to differences in the natural endowment, such as 
language abilities and cultural similarities, as well as human capital investments such as 
education and experience, and their relative levels of explanatory power in determining 
differences in labor market outcomes. 
In particular, Garg and Seeborg's paper finds that both human capital endowments and 
personal characteristics are significant variables in describing the differences in earnings among 
female immigrants (Garg and Seeborg, 2010). The results of this paper suggest that in addition 
to human capital endowments, gender is a significant determinant in the wage outcome of 
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immigrants to the United States. These findings are supported by a number of similar studies that 
address similar questions (Antecol, 2001; Butcher, 2002; Kunze, 2000). 
Section 2.2: Wage Gap Studies 
As applicable to both immigrant and native workers, it is apparent that gender has a 
substantial effect on wages in a few ways. First, inherent differences in preferences between men 
and women mean that women differ from men significantly in terms of tastes and experiences. 
Women tend to have substantially different levels of education, formal training, and work 
experience than men, which have direct effects on productivity and contribute to the gender 
wage gap between men and women (Blau et al. 1986). 
Second, because of differences in preferences, women make considerably different 
human capital choices than men. For example, they choose to pursue different fields of study 
and levels of education. These differences in turn, cause gaps in earnings between men and 
women, since differences in educational tastes propel women towards different career paths than 
men. 
Antecol (200 I) uses cross-sectional data for the earning outcomes of 21 immigrant 
groups to the U.S. and finds that the wage gap variance between these different cohorts can be 
explained by cultural factors such as the traditional understandings of women's role in the 
household and workplace, as well as educational attainment and literacy. The implication of 
these findings is that as levels of educational attainment equalize between men and women, the 
wage gap should diminish. Similarly, Card (1999) uses a twin study to analyze sets of siblings in 
which one twin attains a higher level of education than the other, thereby in theory, controlling 
for differences in aptitude and innate ability. Taken together, these findings in favor of the 
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effects of education on earnings provide a literature base for the hypothesis that as levels of 
education between men and women equalize, the relative wage gap diminishes. 
The impOliance of the relationship between both gender and immigration studies for this 
paper is manifest in the differences in characteristics between men and women within the same 
immigrant group. Because women have substantially different human capital investments and 
preferences than men, differentials in economic opportunity between the source and receiving 
country will affect them differently. Whether the one-child policy's positive effect on 
educational attainment for Chinese women is reflected in the immigrant population will be an 
indicator of the extent to which existing literature is able to explain the findings of this study. 
Section 3: Theory and Hypothesis 
Human capital theory is an extension of Adam Smith's explanation of differences in 
wages between individuals as a function of time, effort, and resource investments in 
productivity-increasing activities (Marshall 1998). In modern economic theory, economists such 
as Mincer and Becker argue that all else held equal, income varies as a direct result of 
investments in human capital such as education, training, and experience. This paper uses human 
capital theory as understood by Mincer and Becker as a framework for exploring the effects of 
the one-child policy on educational attainment and wage outcomes for Chinese immigrant female 
workers. By understanding how the one-child policy affected the decision to invest in education, 
changes in patterns of educational attainment of Chinese females can provide context for how 
this policy affected the wage differential between Chinese immigrant men and women. 
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Section 3.1: The Human Capital Decision to Invest in Education 
The decision to invest in human capital is a combination of expected returns as well as 
opportunity and direct costs. These decisions are typically made through collaboration between 
the individual and their family in order to invest resources in the short run to increase returns in 
the long run. The classic 
� 
example of a decision to invest ] 
in human capital, and the focus 
of this paper, is education. The 
decision to invest in education 
can best be portrayed in an age-
earnings profile (Figure 3.1). 
In this case, if an individual 
Opporturu 
C�t 
doesn't invest in education 
A /I 
FIgure 3.1 
Age�Eamings Profile 
_------ R<:tWT.S College 
G)1U:'UMC 
Gross Ocncflts 
RClUrns 
_----------- lIi;;bScbooJ 
Gr.l!lU;ltc 
beyond high school, the line labeled "Returns High School Graduate" models expected earnings 
over his or her lifetime. Alternatively, if an individual decides to invest in a college education, 
the earning function "Returns College Graduate" best models expected lifetime earnings. The 
return schedule for a college graduate is steeper to reflect the increase in productivity that comes 
with a college education. In particular, the slope of this curve is the rate of return for education. 
A key characteristic of the age-earnings profile is that the returns for a college graduate are not 
immediately realized- in fact, the age-earnings profile for an individual just out of college is 
below the earnings stream for individuals with high-school degree. If the present value of the 
benefits of attending college outweigh the present value of both the opportunity and direct costs, 
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it is in the best economic interest of the individual to invest in a college degree. The same 
intuition applies to higher levels of education. 
Human capital theory's application in the context of educational decision making within 
the family is an important theory for this paper because of the way the one-child policy redefined 
the Chinese family structure. An understanding of the effect of the one-child policy on the 
decision to invest in education provides SUppOlt for this paper's hypothesis that the one-child 
policy had a positive effect on education for Chinese immigrant women. 
Section 3.2 Human Capital Theory 
The decision to invest in education is typically a family decision. Before the one-child 
policy, Chinese families systematically chose to invest more educational resources in the oldest 
son as opposed to daughters (Zhang 2009). In order to' understand this phenomenon, both 
economic and cultural considerations need to be accounted for. 
An important cultural characteristic of the Chinese familial structure is the traditional 
expectation that as parents age, they rely on their oldest son for support and income. Often, 
parents move in with their son and his family after they retire (Zhang 2009). In contrast, it is not 
unusual for daughters to move in with their husband's family after marriage. In the context of 
human capital theory, this cultural norm had significant effects on the decision to send sons to 
school at a higher rate than daughters before the one-child policy. Since traditionally, parents 
rarely moved in with daughters or relied on them as a source of income, in the long-run, the net 
present value for sending a daughter to school was less than the net present value of investing in 
a son's education (Zhang 2009). Because parents frequently moved in with their sons, an 
investment in their education was an investment in their future standard of living. Because 
Chinese parents depend more heavily on their children as a source of income later on in life, 
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considerations of both future earning streams as well as the short -term opportunity costs for 
sending a child to school was especially pertinent to traditional Chinese parents before the one­
child policy. This cultural and economic explanation could account for why parents 
systematically invested more in sons than in daughters before the one-child policy. 
It is likely that the educational attainment disparity that existed before the one-child 
policy contributed to the wage gap between Chinese male and female workers. Human capital 
theory claims that educational attainment and income are directly related. Intuitively, this makes 
sense for a few reasons. First, education increases productivity-enhancing skills such as 
efficiency, punctuality, and the ability to work with others. Secondly, specialized knowledge 
gained while in school means that the company doesn't have to invest as much in training, 
making educated people less costly to hire. Third, an education can act as a screening device or 
signal. Per this view, employers have imperfect information about the work applicant and a 
diploma form either a college or high school acts as a signal to the employer about the 
applicant's work ethic and trainability. Therefore, employers view degrees as a signal of a more 
productive employee (Blau et al. 1986). 
If the one-child policy increased the level of educational attainment for Chinese 
daughters, both human capital and screening theories predict that there should be a 
corresponding increase in wages for Chinese females. The positive correlation between 
education and earnings is what this paper uses as a basis for its two hypotheses. First, that 
Chinese female immigrants born after the one-child policy will attain higher levels of education 
relative to their male counterparts than they did before the one-child policy. Second, that wages 
for Chinese immigrant men and women born after the one-child policy have converged as a 
result. 
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Section 4: Data 
In order to address this paper's first hypothesis-that Chinese female immigrants born 
after the one-child policy are more educated than Chinese female immigrants born before-data 
trom the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series-USA (IPUMS-USA); American Community 
Survey (ACS) are used to analyze educational and wage-earning trends among Chinese 
immigrants to the United States. The ACS is an annual survey of approximately 2 million 
households conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau (Ruggles, et. aI., 2013). For the purposes of 
this paper, data are extracted from the 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 samples. These five 
years represent the five most recent years of the survey and provide the most updated data 
available. Five sample years are chosen to create a pool of data sufficiently large enough to 
obtain accurate results. 
Section 4.1: Difference-in-Differences; Education 
In order to test this paper's first hypothesis that the one-child policy positively affected 
the educational attainment of Chinese female immigrants to the United States, this paper uses a 
difference-in-differences analysis to compare the gains in educational attainment for Chinese 
immigrant women relative to their male counterparts, native women, and Taiwanese women both 
before and after the one-child policy. The sample containing only Chinese immigrants is 
restricted to those who immigrated after the age of 17 to exclude those whose families 
immigrated to the United States while they were young and had the opportunity to have more 
than one child. It also eliminates those who didn't grow up under the one-child policy and didn't 
benefit from the resulting equalization in education. This is an important aspect of this paper 
because it restricts the sample size to only those who were actually affected by the one-child 
policy. 
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Taiwanese immigrants are subject to this same restriction to ensure that the data from this 
sample reflects the conditions of being raised in Taiwan and not in the United States. 
Additionally, all subjects for the educational descriptive statistics are above the age of 25 to 
ensure that most respondents had the opportunity to complete their formal education. After 
controlling for these factors, the samples consist of 34,826 Chinese immigrants, 9,106,904 
Natives, and 13,270 Taiwanese immigrants. While the difference in sample size is notable, they 
are objectively large enough to ensure representative results. FUlihermore, the difference-in­
differences analyses are expressed in percentages relative to the size of the appropriate sample. 
Section 4.2: Difference-in-Differences; Wages 
To test the relationship between education and wages, this paper uses both difference-in­
differences and OLS regression analysis on three specific sample groups. While the descriptive 
statistics for wages utilize the same difference-in-differences methodology as section 4.1, the 
samples for these are limited to those who worked full-time and year round. This additional 
constraint is necessary to prevent those who were unemployed or still in school during the survey 
from negatively biasing the data for wages. After these additional data restrictions, the sample 
size is 14,615 for Chinese immigrants; 4,106,045 for natives, and 6,937 for Taiwanese 
immigrants. These samples sizes are notably smaller than the samples for the difference-in­
differences analysis for education due to the increased restrictions. 
The three different samples extracted from the IPUMS-ACS dataset for the analysis are: 
1. Chinese immigrants who immigrated to the United States after the age of 1 7 and 
are engaged in full-time work. 
2. Native Workers born in the United States over the age of 17 who are engaged in 
full-time work. 
3. Taiwanese immigrants who immigrated to the United States after the age of 17 
and are engaged in full-time work. 
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The purpose of including a second and third sample group is to control for the 
educational gains that women, in general, have made over time. Therefore, to isolate the 
educational effect of the one-child policy, it is important to compare the educational gains made 
by Chinese women to other groups of women. To do this, Chinese female immigrants are 
compared to their male counterparts, native women, and Taiwanese women for both sections of 
difference-in-differences analyses. 
Section 5: Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
Section 5.1: DijJerence-in-DijJerences Analyses; Education 
The first section of this paper's analysis employs difference-in-differences techniques, 
such as those in David Card's 1989 Mariel Boatlift paper. A total of three difference-in­
differences analyses are run for education. Each compares the educational attainment of Chinese 
female immigrants to a comparison group. The three comparisons are: 
• Chinese immigrant women vs. Chinese immigrant men 
• Chinese immigrant women vs. Native women 
• Chinese immigrant women vs. Taiwanese women 
Each of the three difference-in-differences analyses proceeds in four steps. For example, the 
difference-in-differences analysis for Chinese immigrant women vs. Chinese immigrant men is 
calculated as follows: 
1. Partition the sample of Chinese immigrant women and men into two groups: 
Those bom before the one-child policy (1979) and those born after. 
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a. In Table 5.1.1, this step is represented by the values in the columns labeled 
Born Before 1979 (Pre-One Child Policy) and Born 1979 or Later 
(Post-One Child Policy) 
2. For those Chinese immigrants born before the one-child policy (1979), find the 
difference in the probability of having a bachelor's degree or higher between 
women and men. 
a. In Table 5.1.1 this is represented by the Attainment Gap for Bachelor's 
Degree: 38% - 46%= - 8%. 
3. For those Chinese immigrants born after the one-child policy (1979), find the 
difference in the probability of having a bachelor's degree or higher between 
women and men. 
a. In Table 5.1.1 this is represented by the Attainment Gap for Bachelor's 
Degree: 72% - 64%= +8%. 
4. To calculate the difference-in-differences, find the difference between the values 
calculated for steps 2 and 3. 
a. In Table 5.1.1 this is represented by the variable Progress for Chinese 
Women: 9% - (-8%) =+17% 
These steps are repeated for each of the three comparisons to get a holistic perspective on 
how Chinese immigrants' change in educational attainment has progressed over time. 
Educational data is aggregated into two categories: those who have achieved a bachelor's degree 
or more and those who have received less than a bachelor's degree. For the disaggregated tables, 
see Appendix A. 
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Table 5.1.1: Difference-in-Differences: Chinese Immigrant Educational Attainment Before 
and After 1979 
Bachelor's Degree or Higher 
Attainment Gap for 
Bachelor's Degree 
Progress for Chinese Women 
n =34,826 
Born Before 1979 
(pre-One Child Policy) 
Male Female 
46% 38% 
-8% 
+16% 
Born1979 or Later 
(PostcOne Child Policy) 
Male Female 
64% 72% 
+8% 
Table 5.1.1 shows that for the Chinese immigrants born before the one-child policy, 
women were 8% less likely to complete at bachelor' s  degree or higher than their male 
counterparts. However, for those born after the one-child policy, women were 8% more likely to 
obtain a bachelor's degree or higher than their male counterparts. The relative gains for women 
were 17%. In other words, the level of educational attainment for men born after the one-child 
policy (by this standard of measurement) increased 18% and women's increased 34%. The 
difference between these two figures is 16%, which suggests that Chinese women born after the 
one-child policy made substantial gains in education. 
This initial finding supports this paper' s  hypothesis that the one-child policy had a 
positive effect on the Chinese immigrant population to the United States. In order to determine 
whether these improvements are due to the one-child policy, as opposed to gains in education 
made by women in general, Table 5.1.2 displays the difference-in-difference results for native 
and Chinese immigrant women and Table 5.1.3 reports the difIerence-in-difference results for 
Chinese and Taiwanese immigrant women. 
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Table 5.1.2: Difference-in-Differences: Educational Attainment Before and After 1979; 
Attainment Gap for 
Bachelor's n., .... · .... 
+10% +33% 
Table 5.1.2 shows that for Chinese and native women born before the one-child policy, 
Chinese immigrant women were 10% more likely to complete a degree equal to or greater than a 
bachelor' s  degree than native women. However, for native and Chinese immigrant women born 
after the one-child policy, Chinese immigrants were 33% more likely to obtain at least a 
bachelor's degree, increasing the disparity in educational attainment by 23%. This provides 
evidence that Chinese women born after the one child policy made substantial gains in 
educational attainment relative to native women. 
Table 5.1.3: Difference-in-Differences: Educational Attainment Before and After 1979; 
���������W�o�m�e;n�v�s. Taiwanese Women 
Attainment Gap for 
Bachelor's Degre:e 
Taiwanese Women: n=7,514 
Chinese Women: n=18,362 
-38% -6% 
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Table 5.1.3 shows that the difference-in-difference comparison between Taiwanese and 
Chinese immigrant women exhibits the same pattern of results. Taiwanese women historically 
have a higher average level of education than Mainland Chinese women. Of those born before 
1979, 76% of Taiwanese females attained at least a bachelor's degree compared to only 38% of 
Chinese women. Similarly, for those born after 1979, 78% of Taiwanese immigrant women had 
at least a bachelor's degree compared to 72% for Chinese women. The change in relative 
educational attainment improved from -38% to -6% for Chinese immigrant women. In total, the 
relative gains reflected a 32% increase in educational standing for Chinese immigrant women 
relative to Taiwanese immigrant women. 
Taken together, the results from the three difference-in-difference analyses suggest that 
the one-child policy is correlated with an increase in education for Chinese female immigrants in 
a way that is substantially different from the educational gains made by Chinese men, native 
women, and Taiwanese immigrant women. 
Section 5.2 Difference-in-Differences Analyses; Wages 
Because human capital theory hypothesizes a positive relationship between education and 
wages, it is expected that Chinese female immigrants born after the one-child policy will have 
substantially higher wages than their pre-one-child policy counterparts. In order to test this 
relationship, the difference-in-differences analysis for this section includes only those who 
worked full-time, year round. Specifically, the data includes only those who worked at least an 
average of 35 hours per week for more than 40 weeks during the past year of survey. The 
following tln'ee tables show the difference-in-difference calculations for the mean earnings of 
Chinese female immigrants compared to three groups: Chinese immigrant men (Table 5.2.1), 
native females (Table 5.2.2), and Taiwanese female immigrants (Table 5.2.3). 
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Table 5.2.1: Difference-in-Differences: Chinese Immigrants-Mean Annual Wages 
�'"""'=== 
Female Male Female Male 
n�J4,6J5 
Table 5.2.1 shows that for the Chinese immigrants born before the one-child policy, 
women workers earned an average of $15,251.87 less than their male counterparts. In contrast, 
for Chinese immigrants born after the one-child policy, women workers only earned $5,787.15 
less than their male counterparts, an improvement in equity of $9,464.72. These findings provide 
support for the human capital-based hypothesis that education and wages are positively 
con'elated, as the equalization in wages corresponds to the increase in educational attainment for 
Chinese immigrant women. 
A note of discrepancy though is that while women born after the 1979 are more likely to 
have a bachelor's degree than men, their wages are still lower. This could be due to a variety of 
other human capital factors that difference-in-differences analysis cannot control for, such as 
exits from the workplace, differences in preferences for work, and discrimination, Similarly 
important to note is that the pre-one-child policy sample has a higher average wage for both men 
and women due to the positive effect of experience on wages. Since subjects in this sample are 
older, the average pre-one child policy individual will have more experience. Because of this, the 
difference between the two averages is more useful as an analytical tool than mean wages alone. 
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Table 5.2.2: Difference-in-Differences: Chinese Female Women vs. Native Women 
Wage Gap 
Native Women: n=1.802,235 
Chinese Women: n =6,694 
Chinese 
Immigrant 
Females 
Native 
Females 
Chinese 
Immigrant 
Females 
Native 
Females 
Table 5.2.2 shows that for women born before the one-child policy, Chinese immigrant 
females had a substantial earnings advantage. The increase in relative earnings for Chinese 
women after the one-child policy was $11,137.48, which intensified the wage gap between 
Chinese immigrant women and native women. These results are slightly surprising, as we would 
expect immigrants in general to have lower wages because of issues of assimilation. However, 
taking Borjas immigrant selection theory into consideration, this finding could be explained by 
positive selection. In order to compare two similar immigrant groups and control for immigrant 
selection and assimilation, Table 5.2.3 compares mean annual earnings for Chinese immigrants 
to Taiwanese immigrants. 
Table 5.2.3: Difference-in-Differences: Chinese Female Women vs. Taiwanese Women 
Chinese 
Immigrant 
Females 
Taiwanese 
Immigrant 
Females 
Chinese 
Immigrant 
Females 
Taiwanese 
Immigrant 
Females 
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Table 5.2.3 shows that the annual mean earnings differentials for Chinese and Taiwanese 
female immigrants are the largest of all three comparison groups. The Taiwanese women born 
before 1979 earn an average of $104,056.09 per year compared to $80,803.02 for Chinese female 
immigrants. The especially high average for Taiwanese women contributes substantially to the 
large difference between the two immigrant groups, especially since Chinese females born after 
the one-child policy have only a $3,316.47 relative earnings disadvantage. These trends are 
promising for Chinese women because the earnings differentials presented in Table 5.2.3 reflect 
the difference-in-differences analysis in education for these two immigrant groups. If the 
increase in educational attainment for Chinese immigrant women from 38% to 72% is a 
substantial cause for the equalization of the wage profiles between these two immigrant groups, 
then the future earning-streams are likely to improve substantially for Chinese females born after 
1979. 
Taken together, the data from these three tables seem to suggest that there is a positive 
relationship between education and wages for Chinese female immigrants. However, because 
these analyses are biased by the lack of controls for experience and age, a regression analysis 
with built in controls for these characteristics is useful and provides additional perspective. 
Section 6: Earnings Regression Analysis 
Section 6.1: Mincer Earnings Functions 
This section adds another dimension to my research by including three OLS regression 
models to predict the natural log of wages for Chinese immigrants. These regression results will 
help to illuminate the relationship between education and wage earnings to test the extent to 
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which education is a determinant of wages. The purpose of running three separate models is to 
analyze three effects: 
1. The effect of being female on earnings 
2. The effect of being a female born before the one-child policy on earnings 
3. Whether changes in edncational attainment dne to the one-child policy may have 
caused changes in eamings for Chinese immigrants. 
A set of Mincer earnings functions is used to construct econometric models for the three 
respective tests. They are as follows: 
Model : InCwage) = a + f31Cage) + f32Cage
2)+f3demale 
Model 2: In (wage) = a + f31(age) + f32 (age2)+f33 (female * onechild) + f34(female * 
notonechild) 
Model 3: In(wage) = a + f31(age) + f32(age2)+f33(female * one Child) + f34(female * 
notonechild) + f3s (bachormore) 
These variables and their descriptions, as well as expected signs are displayed in Table 6.1 
Table 6.1.1: Variables, Description, and Expected Signs 
Variable Description 
Dependent 
In(wage) natural log of wage 
Independent 
Age 
Age2 
Female 
onechild 
notonechfld 
bachormore 
subject's age at last birthday 
polynomial transfonllation of age 
o = male 
1 = female 
0 =  born after the one-child policy (age < 33) 
I = born before the one-child policy (age 2: 33) 
0 =  bom before the one-child policy (age 2: 33) 
1 = bom after the one-child policy (age < 33) 
0 =  completed less than a bachelor's degree 
I = completed a bachelor's degree or more 
Expected Sign 
positive 
negative 
negative 
negative 
negative 
positive 
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Because age is a proxy for experience, it is expected that as one gets older, wages should 
increase, but at a decreasing rate. Thus, a positive coefficient for age and a negative coefficient 
for age2 is expected. Being female has been proven throughout literature to negatively affect 
wages relative to male workers, due to differences in preference, labor force participation, and 
discrimination (Kunze 2015). 
The variables onechild and notonechild are interacted with the female variable to create 
/33 and /34 for the second and third equations respectively. This means that the reference group 
for all three models is Chinese immigrant men. 
The introduction of the dummy variable, bachormore, is expected to measure how the 
one-child policy affected labor market outcomes through its indirect effect on education. An 
aggregated variable is chosen to represent education as opposed to a set of disaggregated 
variables because many of those in the younger, one-child sample have not completed schooling. 
Therefore the bachormore variable helps to control for this by assuming that those who will 
receive more than a bachelor's degree will have already completed the bachelor's degree by the 
age of 25 and thus will be included in the bachormore variable, even if they haven't finished 
their education to the highest extent. 
Section 6.2: Results 
The regression results presented in this section are used to analyze the accuracy of this paper's 
two hypotheses: First, Chinese female immigrants born after the one-child policy have higher 
levels of educational attainment relative to their male counterparts than those born before. 
Second, wages for Chinese immigrant men and women born after the one-child policy have 
converged as a result. 
• 
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Results in the Model 1 column con'espond to the output for the first equation: 
In(wage) = a + (3,(age) + (3z(agez)+{3demale. This is a baseline regression to test for the 
relationship between wages and age and gender. Output for the second equation, In(wage) = a + 
(3,(age) + (3z (ageZ)+{33 (female * one child) + (34(female * ,one child) , can be found in the 
second column. This model adds in the effect of being born under the one-child policy by 
interacting the one child and ,onechild variables with the female variable. Finally, the output for 
Model 3, = In (wage) = a + (3,(age) + (32 (ageZ)+{33 (female * one Child) + (34(female * 
notonechild) + (3s(bachormore), is found in the third column of Table 6.2 and includes the 
variable for education, bachormore. The reference group for all three models is working 
Chinese immigrant men. These three models are run for Chinese immigrants as well as the two 
control groups; natives and Taiwanese immigrants. The results for the latter two tables can be 
found in Appendix A. 
Table 6.2: Results for Chinese Immigrants 
Model l Model 2 Model 3 
B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) .000*** .000*** .000*** 9.9 1 7  (86.977) 9.842 (75.294) 9.034 (84. 1 54) 
... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _. - - _ .. - - - - - - - _. - - - _. --: ()OO*"" *" -- - - - - - - - - - _ .. - - -- - -. 
O
OC),;·"-,, ---------------------.000*"" - _. 
Age .05 1 (10.781 )  .054 (10.120) .057 (12.987) 
Age2 .000*** .000*** -.001 .000*** -.001 (- 1 1 .735) -
.001 (-11.153) (- 1 2.956) 
Female 
FemOneChild 
FemNotOneChild 
BachOrMore 
R2 
N 
-.179 
.021 
14,615 
.000*** 
("n512) 
-. 1 25 
-.183 
.022 
.000*** 
(-2.6 1 7) 
:609*�* 
(-12.445) 
-.215 
.990 
.345 
***Signiticant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, *Significant at the 10 percent level 
T-statistics indicated in parentheses 
.000*** 
(-5.476) 
. 000*** 
(�1 2337) 
. 000*** 
(82.748) 
Output for Modell offers support for the notion that beingfemale is a statistically 
significant negative predictor of earnings. That is, Chinese female immigrants are predicted to 
earn significantly less than their Chinese male counterparts after controlling for age. This is in 
line with the findings from the difference-in-differences analysis as well. 
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The results for Model 2 in Table 6.2 suggest that in addition to the findings for Model , 
Chinese immigrant females born before the one-child policy (femnotonechild) and Chinese 
immigrant females born after the one-child policy (jemonechild) earn lower wages relative to 
their male reference group. Because the coefficient forfemonechild, -.125, is substantially less 
negative than coefficient forfemnotonechild ,-.183. Chinese female immigrants born after the 
one-child policy seem to be at less of an earnings disadvantage than those born before. Because 
education is not controlled for in this model, these results support the hypothesis that the one­
child policy contributed to the diminishing wage gap between Chinese immigrant men and 
women. Whether these findings are due to the policy's effect on education are addressed in 
Model 3. 
Model 3 adds a control variable for education, bachormore, which allows for the analysis 
the one-child policy's effect on wages of Chinese immigrant women after controlling for 
education. The change of the coefficient forfemnotonechild from -.183 in Model 2 to -148 in 
Model 3 can be explained by the fact that Chinese immigrant women born before the one-child 
policy have substantially lower levels of education than their male counterparts (see Table 
5.1.1). Controlling for education in Model 3 caused the gender wage gap between Chinese 
immigrants born before the one-child policy to decrease because controlling for effects of 
education has a more negative effect on the wages for the more educated men in the reference 
group than on the women born before the one-child policy. 
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In contrast, the coefficient forjemonechild changed in the opposite direction from -.123 
in Model 2 to -.215 in Model 3, suggesting that education accounted for a substantial portion of 
the relative wage gains made by Chinese immigrant women born after the one-child policy. 
Because Chinese immigrant women born after the one-child policy attained higher levels of 
education relative to their male counterparts (see Table 5.1.1), controlling for education 
diminishes the wage gains made by Chinese immigrant women born after the one-child policy 
and increases the gender wage gap. 
An additional relationship to note is the magnitude of the coefficients for femonechild 
andfemnotonechild in Model 3. The coefficients for these variables are -.215 and -.148, 
respectively. This relationship is reversed from the output for Model 2, where women born 
before the one-child policy were at a greater earnings disadvantage than women born after. The 
reversal of this relationship between earnings for women born before and after the policy is 
likely due to the short-term tradeoff between and educated and experience. Because the women 
born after the one-child policy are younger and more educated, they are likely still at the 
beginning of their earnings function, which means that they are at the low point of their earnings­
functions. This is evident in Figure 3.1 (pg I O). An implication of this is that the unexpected 
wage disadvantage of Chinese immigrant women born after the one-child policy relative to 
Chinese immigrant women born before is likely to change as the younger, post-one-child policy 
cohort move up their age earnings profiles over time. 
These results imply that Chinese immigrant women born after the one-child policy have 
just entered the workforce and haven't realized the full returns to their education yet. Over time, 
their earnings function will be steeper than those who didn't attain at least a bachelor's degree 
because of the investment in education's rate of return. However, the realization of these returns 
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take time and for the younger, one-child cohort, it is likely that at the time of this study, not 
enough time has passed for the returns to education to be reflected in their annualized wages yet. 
Finally, it is important to note that the adjusted R2 increases for each model, which is 
expected because the addition of two and three more variables in Model 2 and Model 3 
respectively, increases the explanatory power of the model. 
Section 7: Conclusion 
This paper has explored the effects of the one-child policy on the relative levels of 
educational attainment and wage earnings of Chinese female immigrant workers to answer two 
questions: first, did the one-child policy positively affect the levels of education for Chinese 
immigrant women; second, did wages for Chinese immigrant women converge with their male 
counterparts as a result? This paper used data from the American Community Survey to conduct 
difference-in-differences analysis for both educational attainment and wages. The findings of 
these analyses suggest that the one-child policy had a positive impact on both the relative levels 
of educational attainment and the wage gap for Chinese female immigrants. This paper expanded 
on these findings by using a set of three Mincer earnings functions to analyze the relationship 
between education and wages in a set of OLS regression models. The findings from this analysis 
suggest that Chinese female immigrants generally earn less than their Chinese male immigrant 
counterparts. The earnings disadvantage was especially high for Chinese female immigrants born 
before the one-child policy. However, once education was controlled for, women born after the 
one-child policy had a higher earnings disadvantage relative to both their male counterparts and 
women in the sample who were born before the one-child policy. Two potential reasons for this 
unexpected finding are related to this cohort's young age and high level of education. The 
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combination of these characteristics suggests that the earnings disadvantage exists for women 
born after the one-child policy for two reasons. First, because many of these women are young 
and highly educated, they are still at the beginning of their age-earnings profile and have not yet 
benefited from the returns to education. Second, those who will achieve the highest levels of 
education were excluded from the regression model because they are likely still in school. 
Because education and wages are positively cOiTelated, the exclusion of the most highly educated 
individuals will negatively bias the data for this particular group. 
These two explanations suggest that future research should revisit these earnings 
functions after those born after the one-child policy have had the opportunity to establish 
themselves in the workforce and benefit from their returns to education. Additional research 
could also address fmiher shortcomings of this paper by analyzing these same questions by 
following the same cohort of Chinese immigrants born after the-one-child policy over a period of 
time and comparing their salaries to a similar cohort born before the one-child policy. A third 
route for potential future research would be to use Chinese data to analyze the same questions 
this paper addresses. Utilizing Chinese data would shift the focus away from the one-child 
policy's effect on immigrants, to its effect on Chinese citizens. It would have the additional 
benefit of mitigating selection biases inherent in addressing a question of this SOli by using 
immigrant data. 
In conclusion, the goal of this paper was to analyze the educational and labor market 
effects of the one-child policy on Chinese female immigrants. The difference-in-differences 
outcomes for educational attainment are substantial and provide evidence that snpports this 
paper's hypothesis that the one-child policy had a positive effect on the educational outcomes for 
Chinese immigrant women. Both the differences-in-differences and regression analysis for the 
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effect of  the one-child policy on wages is  inconclusive and should be revisited in the future. The 
implications of this study are important because they help inform the relationship between social 
policy and wages, specifically the indirect routes through which social policy can affect 
education and wages. 
• 
Works Cited 
Antecol, Heather. "Why Is There Interethnic Variation in the Gender Wage Gap?: The Role of 
Cultural Factors." The Journal 0/ Human Resources36.1 (200 I) :  119. Web. 
Blau, Francine D., and Marianne A. Ferber. The Economics o/Women, Men, and Work. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986. Print. 
Borjas, George J. "Labor Mobility." Labor Economics. 6th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 
2005. 329-43. Print. 
3 0  
Borjas, George. "Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants." American Economic Review 
(1987): n. pag. Web. 
Butcher, Kristin F. "The Immigrant and Native-Born Wage Distributions: Evidence from United 
States Censuses." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 56.1 (2002): 97-121. JSTOR. 
Web. 26 Sept. 2015. 
Card, D. (1999) "The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings", in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card 
(eds.) Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3A, North Holland 
Card, D. (1989) "The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market", Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review Vol. 43, No. 2 (Jan., 1990), pp. 245-257 
Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. "Immigrant Selectivity and Wages: The Evidence for Women." The 
American Economic Review 83.4 (1993): 986-93 .JSTOR. Web. 23 Sept. 2015. 
Dowhan Daniel J, Duleep, Harriette O. United States. Division of Economic Research. Office of 
Research, Evaluation, and Statistics. Research on Immigrant Earnings. N.p., 2008. Web. 
24 Sept. 2015. 
Garg, Mahi, and Michael Seeborg. "The Effect of Place of Origin on the Relative Earnings of 
Immigrant Women." International Business & Economics Research Journal 9.2 (2010): 
117-28. Web. 
Kunze, Astrid, The Determination of Wages and the Gender Wage Gap: A Survey (August 
2000). IZA Discussion Paper No.193. 
Lin, Carl. "Earnings Gap, Cohort Effect and Economic Assimilation of Immigrants from 
Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in the United States." Review (){ International 
Economics 21.2 (2013): 249-65. Web. 
3 1  
O'Neill, June. "Why the Gender Gap in Wages Narrowed in the 1980s."Journa/ of Labor 
Economics 11.1, Part 1: Essays in Honor of Jacob Mincer (1993): 205-28. JSTOR. Web. 
26 Sept. 2015. 
Marshall, Gordon. "Human-capital theory." A Dictionary of Sociology. 1998. Encyclopedia.com. 
24 Oct. 2015 
"Immigrant Women in the United States: A Portrait of Demographic Diversity." American 
Immigration Council. 10 Sept. 2014. Web. 15 Oct. 2015 
Ruggles, Steven; Genadek, Katie, et al. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6. O. 
2013. Minneapolis: Historical Census Projects, University of Minnesota. 20 August 2013 
Roy, Arthur. "Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings." Oxford Economic Papers (1951): 
135-46. JSTOR. Web. 
3 2  
Appendix of Tables 
Table A.I: Disaggregated Education Data- Chinese /mmigrallts 
Born Before 1979 Born 1979 or Later 
(Pre-One Child Policy) (Post-One Child Policy) 
Male Female Male Female 
LessThanHSD 27% 30% 7% 6% 
HSdiploma 15% 17% 11% 7% 
SomeCollege 8% 8% 14% 7% 
Bachelor's 16% 19% 43% 47% 
Masters 16% 13% 13% 13% 
Professional 3% 2% 5% 9% 
Doctoral 11% 4% 2% 4% 
Associate 4% 6% 5% 8% 
Table A.2: Disaggregated Education Data- Natil'es 
Born Before 1979 Born J979 or Later 
(Pre-One ChildPolicy) (Post-One Child Policy) 
Male Female Male Female 
LessThanHSD 12% 10% 19% 15% 
HSdiploma 31% 31% 29% 22% 
SomeCollege 21% 22% 29% 32% 
Bachelor's 17% 17% 13% 18% 
Masters 8% 9% 2% 5% 
Professional 3% 1% 1% 1% 
Doctoral 2% 1% 0% 0% 
Associate 7% 9% 6% 7% 
:--::-- -----"-:---:­Table A.3: Dimggregated Educlltiofl Da{iI- Taiwanese lmmigl'llilt\ 
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_��_._ 0�_��,�" �"� -��,�,, � "  �,,�,�� 
Born Before 1979 Born 1979 or Later 
(pre-One Child Policy) (post-One Child Policy) 
Male Female Male Female 
LessThanHSD 4% 8% 1% 1% 
HSdiploma 7% 12% 5% 2% 
SomeCollege 8% 9% 12% 8% 
Bachelor's 25% 31% 52% 51% 
Masters 30% 23% 15% 18% 
Professional 7% 3% 6% 14% 
Doctoral 14% 4% 4% 2% 
Associate 5% 9% 4% 5% 
Table A.4: Difference-in-Differences: Native Bache/or's Degree 
<Bachelor's Degree 
::: Bachelor's Degree 
Born Before 1979 
(Pre-One Child Policy) 
Male Female 
71% 72% 
29% 28% 
Born 1979 or Later 
(Post-One Child Policy) 
Male Female 
71% 61% 
29% 39% 
--;-;����-:-c-____ -�-,-----c--,-------Attaimllent GapJor 
Bachelor's Degree 
- 1 %  +10% 
Progress for Women + 1 1% 
- - -" --"-"- -"- --
Table AS: Difference-ill-Differences: Tlliwllllese Immigrl!llt Bachelo/' 's Degree 
< Bachelor's Degree 
::: Bachelor's Degree 
Born Before 1979 Born 1979 or Later 
(Pre-One Child Policy) (post-One Child Policy) 
Male Female Male Female 
24% 38% 22% 1 5% 
76% 62% 78% 85% 
-- -"-- " " "- - -" " - :::---=--"�-----Attainment Gap for 
Bachelor's Degree 
- 1 4% +7% 
Progress for Women +21% 
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Table A. 6: In(wage) Regression Results for Natives 
�odel l �odel 2 �odel 3 
B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) .000*** .000*** .000*** 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _  �._� 4� _ _ _ _ _  ,<�3_�0,9_�) _ _ _ _ _ _  ��� �_8 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  \��! ?,��_8) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  �._�:_� _ _ _ _ _ _  {�P:l,��l _ . 
Age 
Age' 
Female 
FemOneChild 
FemNotOneChild 
BachOrMore 
R' 
N 
. 000*** .000*** .000*** .088 (505 . 13) .
097 (506.23 1 )  .086 (492.264) 
-.001 .000*** -.001 .000*** -.001 .000*** (438.726) (-450.949) (-433.29) 
-.274 
. 1 25 
4,1 06,045 
.000*** .000*** 
(-396.3 1 )  (- 1 82.76) 
-.144 
-.313 
. 1 25 
.000*** .000*** -.225 (-1 06.766) (-445.94) 
.000*** (- .000*** -.3 1 4  405.21 1 )  (896.992) 
.582 
.276 
.000*** 
(2224.89) 
***Significant at the 1 percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, *Significant at the 10 percent level 
T -statistics included in parentheses 
Table A. 7: In(wage) Regression Results for Taiwanese Immigrants 
�odel l �odel 2 �odel 3 
B Sig. B Sig. B Sig. 
(Constant) 
9 8 1 7  .00
0*** 9 642 .000
*** 8 982 .000*
** 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  
. 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  (?_�:? ?l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  : _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  f?_!:? �_?) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  � _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  (� _I §<?) _ _ _  . 
Age .066 
Age' -.001 
Female -.3 1 7  
FemOneChild 
FemNotOneChild 
BachOrMore 
R' . 125 
N 4, 1 06,045 
. 000*** .000*** .000*** 
(9.359) .073 (9.3) 
.074 ( 1 0. 1 67) 
.000*** -.001 .000*** .000*** (-9.508) (-9.525) -.001 (-1 0.09) 
.000*** 
(- 17 .043) 
-.209 .000*** - . 198 .000*** (-3.628) (-3.73) 
-.328 .000*** -.259 .000**
* 
(-16.976) (-14.453) 
.699 .000*** (33.746) 
. 125 .276 
***Significant at the I percent level, **Significant at the 5 percent level, *Signiticant at the 1 0  percent level 
T-statistics included in parentheses 
